年來自分が考へた叉自分が多少實行し來りたる處世の方針は何處へ行つた。前後を切斷せよ、妄りに過去に執着する勿れ、徒らに將來に望を屬する勿れ、滿身の力を込めて現在に働けというのが乃公の主義なのである。                      「倫敦消息」



McGinn's new book.


The title appears disturbing at least to my ears. And you see some who picked up on the title in his blog


although nothing hangs on here...










Hume Treatise 3.1.1-2

Meaning: Moore Princhipia, Stevenson `The emotive meaning of ethical terms', Gibbard `Wise choices, apt feelings, Blackburn `Naturalizing Norms'

Nihilism: Harman ``Ethics and Observation', Mackie `Inventing right and wrong', Sturgeon `Moral Explanations', Quinn `Truth and explanation in ethics'.

Realism: Boyd `How to be a moral realist', Railton `Moral realism', Shafer-Landau `Ethical non-naturalism'.

Sensibility Theories: McDowell `Values and secondary qualities', `Projection and truth in ethics', Wiggins `A sensible subjectivism?', Blackburn `How to be an ethical antirealist'

Constructivism: Rawls `Kantian constructivism', Scanlon `Contractualism and Utilitarianism', Korsgaard `Sources of normativity'.

Practical reasoning: Williams `Internal and external reasons', Korsgaard `Skepticism about practical reason', Nagel `The possibility of altruism', Foot `Morality as a system of hypothetical imperatives'.


The theorizing-theory of mind-reading development

*** Gopnik, A. and Wellman, H. (1994). The theory theory. In L. Hirschfeld and S. Gelman (eds.) Mapping the Mind, CUP.

*** Gopnik, A. (1996). The scientist as child. Philosophy of Science, 63, 485-514.

- Wellman, H., Cross, D., and Watson, J. (2001). Meta-analysis of theory-of-mind development: the truth about false belief. Child Development, 72, 655-684.

- Scholl, B. and Leslie, A. (2001). Minds, modules, and meta-analysis. Child Development, 72, 696-701. (A reply to Wellman et al., 2001.)

- Gopnik, A. and Melzoff, A. (1997). Words, Thoughts, and Theories, MIT Press.

- Gopnik, A., Glymour, C., Sobel, D., Shulz, L., Kushnir, T., and Danks, D. (2004). A theory of causal learning in children: Causal maps and Bayes nets. Psychological Review, 111, 1, 1-31.

- Carruthers, P. (2002). The roots of scientific reasoning: infancy, modularity, and the art of tracking. In P.Carruthers, S.Stich and M.Siegal (eds.), The Cognitive Basis of Science. CUP.

- Stich, P. et al. (2002). The baby in the labcoat. In P.Carruthers, S.Stich and M.Siegal (eds.), The Cognitive Basis of Science. CUP.

A simulationist account

*** Goldman (2006), chapter 7.

- Goldman (2006), chapters 2-4.

- Criticisms of simulationism may be found in Nichols and Stich (2003) and the papers by Gopnik and Wellman, Gopnik, and Wellman et al.

A mixed view

*** Nichols and Stich (2003), chapter 3.

- Nichols and Stich (2003), chapter 2.

Mirror neurons and “low-level simulation”

*** Goldman (2006), chapter 6.

- Numerous mirror-neuron articles referenced in Goldman (2006).

- Southgate, V., Gergely, G., & Csibra, G. (in press). Does the mirror neuron system and its impairment explain human imitation and autism? In J.A. Pineda (Ed.), The Role of Mirroring Processes in Social Cognition. Humana Press.

- Numerous papers and discussion-notes posted at Interdisciplines (an on-line interdisciplinary forum hosted out of CNRS, Paris).

A modular account

*** Scholl, B. and Leslie, A. (1999). Modularity, development, and “theory of mind”. Mind and Language, 14, 131-153.

*** Scholl, B. and Leslie, A. (2001). Minds, modules, and meta-analysis. Child Development, 72, 696-701.

- Baron-Cohen, S. (1999). Does the study of autism justify minimalist innate modularity? Learning and Individual Differences, 10, 179-191.

- Goldman (2006), chapter 5.

- Currie, G. and Sterelny, K. (2000). How to think about the modularity of mind-reading. Philosophical Quarterly, 50, 145-160. [library research port]

- Modular accounts are also criticized in Nichols and Stich (2003), chapter 3.

- Barrett, C. and Kurzban, R. (2006). Modularity in cognition: framing the debate. Psychological Review, 113, 628-647.

- Carruthers, P. (2006) The Architecture of the Mind, chapters 1-3.

Mind-reading in infancy and “the curse of knowledge”

*** Birch, S. and Bloom, P. (2004). Understanding children’s and adults’ limitations in mental state reasoning. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8, 255-260.

*** Surian, L., Caldi, S., and Sperber, D. (2007). Attribution of beliefs by 13-month-old infants. Psychological Science, 18, 580-586.

*** Southgate, V., Senju, A., and Csibra, G. (2007). Action anticipation through attribution of false belief by 2-year-olds. Psychological Science, 18, 587-592.

- Onishi, K. and Baillargeon, R. (2005). Do 15-month-olds understand false beliefs? Science, 5719, 255-258.

- Bosco, F., Friedman, O., and Leslie, A. (2006). Recognition of pretend and real actions in play by 1- and 2-year-olds: early success and why they fail. Cognitive Development, 21, 3-10.

- Onishi, K., Baillargeon, R., and Leslie, A. (2007). 15-month-old infants detect violations in pretend scenarios. Acta Psychologica, 124, 106-128.

- Friedman, O., & Leslie, A.M. (2005). Processing demands in belief-desire reasoning: Inhibition or general difficulty? Developmental Science, 8, 218?225.

- Bernstein, D., Atance, C., Meltzoff, A., and Loftus, G. (2007). Hindsight bias and developing theories of mind. Child Development, 78:4, 1374-1394.

- Keysar, B., Lin, S., and Barr, D. (2003). Limits on theory of mind use in adults. Cognition, 89, 25-41.

- Newton, A. and de Villiers, J. (2007). Thinking while talking: adults fail nonverbal false-belief reasoning. Psychological Science, 18, 574-579.

Autism: mind-reading and meta-cognition

*** Baron-Cohen, S. (2001). Theory of mind in autism: a review. International Review of Mental Retardation, 23.

*** Frith, U. and Happ?, F. (1999). Theory of mind and self-consciousness: what is it like to be autistic? Mind and Language, 14, 1-22.

*** Nichols and Stich (2003). Pp. 178-187.

- Philips, W., Baron-Cohen, S., and Rutter, M. (1998). Understanding intention in normal development and autism. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 16, 337-348.

- Farrant, A., Boucher, J., and Blades, M. (1999). Metamemory in children with autism. Child Development, 70, 107-131.

- Blake, R., Turner, L., Smoski, M., Pozdol, S., and Stone, W. (2003). Visual recognition of biological motion is impaired in children with autism. Psychological Science, 14, 151-158.

- Ceponiene, R., Lepisto, T., Shestakova, A., Vanhala, R., Alku, P., Naatanen, R., and Yaguchi, K. (2003). Speech-sound-selective auditory impairment in children with autism: they can perceive but do not attend. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 100, 5567-5572.

- Pelphrey, K., Morris, J., and McCarthy, G. (2005). Neural basis of eye gaze processing deficits in autism. Brain, 128, 1038-1048.

- Jarrold, C., Boucher, J., and Smith, P. (1993). Symbolic play in autism: a review. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 23, 281-387.

- Lewis, V. and Boucher, J. (1988). Spontaneous, instructed, and elicited play in relatively able autistic children. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 6, 315-324.

Denying introspection for attitudes (or: the priority of mind-reading over introspection)

*** Carruthers, P. (2007). The illusion of conscious will. Synthese, 96, 197-213.

*** Carruthers, P. (2008b). Cartesian epistemology: is the theory of the self-transparent mind innate? Journal of Consciousness Studies, 15.

*** Carruthers, P. (forthcoming). Introspection: divided and partly eliminated. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

- Bayne, T. and Pacherie, E. (2007). Narrators and comparators: the architecture of agentive self-awareness. Synthese, 159.

- Peacocke, C. (2007). Mental action and self-awareness I . In J. Cohen and B. McLaughlin (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.

- Peacocke, C. (2008). Mental action and self-awareness II. In L. O’Brien and M. Soteriou (eds.), Mental Action. OUP.

- Stephens, L. and Graham, G. (2000) When Self-Consciousness Breaks. MIT Press.

- Blakemore, S. and Frith, C. (2003). Self-awareness and action. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 13, 219-224.

- Rey, G. (2008). (Even higher-order) intentionality without consciousness. Review Internationale de Philosophie.

The priority of introspection over mind-reading

*** Goldman (2006), chapters 9 & 10.

The independence of introspection from mind-reading

*** Nichols and Stich (2003), chapter 4.

The evolution of mind-reading and meta-cognition

*** Byrne, R. (1996). Machiavellian intelligence. Evolutionary Anthropology, 5, 135-143.

*** Byrne, R. (2003). Tracing the evolutionary path of cognition: Tactical deception in primates. In M Br?ne, H Ribbert & W Schiefenh?vel (Eds) The social brain: Evolution and Pathology. John Wiley, London.

*** Metcalfe, J. (2008). Evolution of metacognition. In J. Dunlosky and R. Bjork (eds.), Handbook of Metacognition and Learning, Erlbaum.

- Byrne, R. and Whiten, A., eds. (1988). Machiavellian Intelligence: social expertise and the evolution of intellect in monkeys, apes, and humans. Oxford University Press.

- Byrne, R. and Whiten, A., eds. (1997). Machiavellian Intelligence II: extensions and evaluations. Cambridge University Press.

Evolution (2): meta-cognition in animals? (or: what is genuine meta-cognition?)

*** Carruthers, P. (2008a). Meta-cognition in animals: a skeptical look. Mind and Language, 23, 58-89.

- Many papers on meta-cognitive experiments with animals, referenced in Carruthers (2008a).

- Farrant, A., Boucher, J., and Blades, M. (1999). Metamemory in children with autism. Child Development, 70, 107-131. [via research port]

- Anderson, M. and Perlis, D. (2005). Logic, self-awareness and self-improvement: the meta-cognitive loop and the problem of brittleness. Journal of Logic and Computation, 15, 21-40.








Kantian constructivism in moral theory
の第一講義``Rational and Full Autonomy'' Section III に出てきたのを読みました.他にもいっぱいでてくるのでしょうが,ロールズを読んだのなんか初めてなので.




moral discourse and practice が教科書ですが,ウィトゲンシュタインとハーバマスだけさけて読んでます.そこは講師の趣味とかいろいろあるんでしょうが.あいかわらずですが,ウィトゲンシュタインの扱いの悪さには目を見張ります.

semantics, cross-cultural style
なんで香港人に英語で聞くの,とか,それはともかくも,なんで実験のprobes がそんなに違うの,とかとかつっこみどころ満載で,でもまあ,着眼点はよかった?ということなのでしょうか.